Multiple Assignment Problems of Indivisible Goods without Monetary Transfer
نویسنده
چکیده
The paper studies the fair allocation of a finite set of indivisible goods among a finite set of agents. We focus on multiple assignment problems without free disposal so that, at least one agent receives more than one object. No monetary transfers are involved. The criteria include: (i) Pareto-efficiency; (ii) no-envy and derived notions namely single object no-envy which requires that all agents should prefer their allocation to any object assigned to the others and conditional no-envy (respectively conditional single object no-envy) which requires that the solutions select envy-free (respectively single object envy-free) allocations whenever such allocations exist; (iii) a lower bound based on the ranks that individuals give to each subset of goods according to their preferences. We analyze the existence of allocation rules satisfying these axioms. Fair allocation rules are eventually proposed.
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