A Model of Bargaining with Incomplete Information
نویسنده
چکیده
We study the equilibrium outcomes of two-person bargaining problems in which each party has “outside option” known only to himself. We examin two game forms, a sequential-move game and a simulteneous-move game. In this context we discuss the failure to reach agreements and the loss of efficiency thereof. Invoking the analogy between the sequentialmove game and the familiar ultimatum game we also provide new interpretation of the experimental evidence regarding the players behavior in the ultimatum game.
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تاریخ انتشار 2006