Economic Inequality, Redistribution, and Political Inequality
نویسندگان
چکیده
Based on individual and macro-level data collected in 18 OECD democracies, we find that income inequality at the macrolevel depresses electoral participation. At the level of individual citizens, we find that the effects of income differentials are linear: individuals who are below the median income in society are less likely to participate in elections, while those above the median income are more likely to do so. Our analyses also reveal that overall income inequality affects people at different ends of the income distribution similarly. Finally, we find that the effect of inequality on participation is, in part, driven by welfare states. We show that decommodification enhances political participation, and it does so for individuals in the upper and the lower half of the income distribution. Paper prepared for presentation at the conference on “Income Inequality, Representation, and Democracy: Europe in Comparative Perspective.” Maxwell School, Syracuse University, 6-7 May 2005. ***Preliminary Draft*** Acknowledgments: We are grateful to Michael McDonald and Lyle Scruggs for help with obtaining some of the data. The survey data are available as ICPSR Study No.3975. The original collector of the data, ICPSR, and the relevant funding agency bear no responsibility for uses of this collection or for interpretations or inferences based upon such uses.
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