Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: the Two-Player Case∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct,
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