Countering chosen-ciphertext attacks against noncommutative polly cracker-type cryptosystems
نویسنده
چکیده
In [2], Stanislav Bulygin presents a chosen-ciphertext attack against certain instances of noncommutative polly cracker-type cryptosystems which were proposed in [7] and [9]. In this article, we present generalized versions of this attack, which can be used against virtually all polly cracker-type cryptosystems. We then present a simple but effective techique to counter these attacks. We also present a technique to counter an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack which was first described by Neil Koblitz in [8].
منابع مشابه
Noncommutative Polly Cracker-type cryptosystems and chosen-ciphertext security
In this paper we consider chosen-ciphertext attacks against noncommutative Polly Cracker-type cryptosystems. We present several versions of these attacks, as well as techniques to counter them. First we introduce a chosen-ciphertext attack, which assumes a very simple private key. We then present generalizations of this attack which are valid in more general situations, and propose a simple but...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
دوره 2005 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2005