Optimistic-Conservative Bidding in Sequential Auctions

نویسندگان

  • Avinatan Hassidim
  • Yishay Mansour
چکیده

In this work we consider selling items using a sequential first price auction mechanism. We generalize the assumption of conservative bidding to extensive form games (henceforth optimistic conservative bidding), and show that for both linear and unit demand valuations, the only pure subgame perfect equilibrium where buyers are bidding in an optimistic conservative manner is the minimal Walrasian equilibrium. In addition, we show examples where without the requirement of conservative bidding, subgame perfect equilibria can admit a variety of unlikely predictions, including high price of anarchy and low revenue in markets composed of additive bidders, equilibria which elicit all the surplus as revenue, and more. We also show that the order in which the items are sold can influence the outcome. Bar-Ilan University and Google. [email protected] Blavatnik School of Computer Science, Tel Aviv University. This research was supported in part by The Israeli Centers of Research Excellence (I-CORE) program, (Center No. 4/11), by a grant from the Israel Science Foundation, by a grant from United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF), and by a grant from the Israeli Ministry of Science (MoS). [email protected]

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • CoRR

دوره abs/1501.07687  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2015