On Sufficiency of Dominant Strategy Implementation in Environments with Correlated Types
نویسنده
چکیده
We show that for any mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism for social choice environments with correlated types when agent’s matrix of conditional probabilities satisfies the full rank condition. JEL classifications: D82
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