Simplified Mechanisms with Applications to Sponsored Search and Package Auctions

نویسنده

  • Paul Milgrom
چکیده

Simplified Mechanisms with Applications to Sponsored Search and Package Auctions Paul Milgrom First draft: August 16, 2007 This draft: October 13, 2007 A simplified mechanism is a direct mechanism modified by restricting the set of reports or bids. An example is the auction used to place ads on Internet search pages, in which each advertiser bids a single price to determine the allocation of eight or more ad positions on a page. If a simplified mechanism satisfies the “best-reply-closure” property, then all Nash equilibria of the simplified mechanism are also equilibria of the original direct mechanism. For search advertising auctions, suitable simplifications eliminate inefficient, low-revenue equilibria that are favored in the original direct mechanism when bidding costs are positive.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions

Simplified Mechanisms with an Application to Sponsored-Search Auctions Paul Milgrom First draft: August 16, 2007 This draft: December 17, 2008 A mechanism can be simplified by restricting its message space. If the restricted message spaces satisfy a certain “outcome closure property,” then the simplification is “tight”: for every , any Nash equilibrium of the simplified mechanism is also an Nas...

متن کامل

Models for Budget Constrained Auctions: an Application to Sponsored Search & Other Auctions

Title of dissertation: MODELS FOR BUDGET CONSTRAINED AUCTIONS: AN APPLICATION TO SPONSORED SEARCH & OTHER AUCTIONS Abhishek Pani, Doctor of Philosophy, 2010 Dissertation directed by: Professor Subramanian Raghavan Robert H. Smith School of Business The last decade has seen the emergence of auction mechanisms for pricing and allocating goods on the Internet. A successful application area for auc...

متن کامل

Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions using Hybrid Ant Colony Optimization and Multi-Neighborhood Local Search

A combinatorial auction is an auction where the bidders have the choice to bid on bundles of items. The WDP in combinatorial auctions is the problem of finding winning bids that maximize the auctioneer’s revenue under the constraint that each item can be allocated to at most one bidder. The WDP is known as an NP-hard problem with practical applications like electronic commerce, production manag...

متن کامل

A Dominant Strategy Truthful, Deterministic Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism with Logarithmic Regret

Stochastic multi-armed bandit (MAB) mechanisms are widely used in sponsored search auctions, crowdsourcing, online procurement, etc. Existing stochastic MAB mechanisms with a deterministic payment rule, proposed in the literature, necessarily suffer a regret of Ω(T ), where T is the number of time steps. This happens because the existing mechanisms consider the worst case scenario where the mea...

متن کامل

Truthful Learning Mechanisms for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search Auctions with Externalities

Sponsored search auctions constitute one of the most successful applicationsof microeconomic mechanisms. In mechanism design, auctions are usuallydesigned to incentivize advertisers to bid their truthful valuations and, at thesame time, to assure both the advertisers and the auctioneer a non–negativeutility. Nonetheless, in sponsored search auctions, the click–through–rates<...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2007