Taking a Mental Stance Towards Artificial Systems

This paper argues that supervised cognitive growth in artifacts will be very difficult to achieve without detailed knowledge about systems‟ internal states. Physical information is too low level to provide a useful understanding of a system‟s behavior, and it is more pragmatically useful to take a mental stance towards an artificial system and interpret its actions in terms of mental states. This mental stance is similar to Dennett‟s intentional stance, except the ascription of beliefs and rationality in the intentional stance is replaced by the attribution of low level mental states in the mental stance. In some cases it might also be useful to take a conscious stance towards an artificial system that interprets its behavior as the outcome of a conscious decision making process. Since most artifacts lack language, automatic analysis techniques have to be used to identify the contents of their minds, and the second half of this paper suggests how some of the earlier work of Aleksander and Atlas can be applied in this area.