Pii: S1090-5138(00)00030-1
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper I evaluate the merit of costly signaling theory (CST) as a paradigm for understanding why men of Ifaluk atoll torch fish. I argue that torch fishing is a handicap that signals men’s productivity. Consistent with CST, torch fishing is observed by the predicted audience (women), energetically costly to perform, and a reliable indicator of the frequency a man fishes during the trade wind season. Contrary to expectations of who should benefit from torch fishing and consequently participate, torch fishers are not primarily young and unmarried. Torch fishers, however, are predominately from the matriline that owns the canoe on which they fish, suggesting that torch fishing also signals the productivity of a matriline. Although these results support the possibility that torch fishing is a handicap, no data are presented which demonstrate that torch fishers achieve any gains from sending the costly signal. This shortcoming and other directions for future research on Ifaluk foraging decisions are discussed. © 2000 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
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