Simulating Norms, Social Inequality, and Functional Change in Artificial Societies

In this paper, we compare the computational and sociological study of norms, and resimulate previous simulations (Conte and Castelfranchi 1995a, Castelfranchi, Conte and Paolucci 1998) under slightly different conditions. First, we analyze the relation between norms, social inequality and functional change more closely. Due to our results, the hypothesis stating that the "finderkeeper" norm while controlling aggression efficaciously reduces social inequality holds only in quite egalitarian societies. Throughout a variety of inegalitarian societies, it instead increases social inequality. This argument which can be traced back to Marx is being investigated by use of computer simulations of artificial societies. Second, we remodel normative behaviour from a sociological point of view by implementing Haferkamp's theory of action approach to deviant behaviour. Following the game theoretic models, the computational study of norms has up to now ignored the importance of power in explaining how norms affect social behaviour, how norms emerge, become established and internalized, and change. By simulating Haferkamp and repeating the Conte and Castelfranchi experiments, we demonstrate that it is possible to integrate power into computational models of norms.