Generalized monotonicity and strategy−proofness: A note
نویسنده
چکیده
In this note we define generalized monotonicity which is a generalized version of monotonicity due to Muller and Satterthwaite (1979) for a social choice function under individual preferences which permit indifference, and shall show that generalized monotonicity and strategy−proofness are equivalent. I would like to thank Bhaskar Dutta and the anonymous referee for helpful comments. Citation: Tanaka, Yasuhito, (2001) "Generalized monotonicity and strategy−proofness: A note." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 11 pp. 1−6 Submitted: June 25, 2001. Accepted: October 10, 2001. URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2001/volume4/EB−01D70005A.pdf
منابع مشابه
Generalized monotonicity and strategy−proofness for non−resolute social choice correspondences
Recently there are several works which analyzed the strategy−proofness of non−resolute social choice rules such as Duggan and Schwartz (2000) and Ching and Zhou (2001). In these analyses it was assumed that individual preferences are linear, that is, they excluded indifference from individual preferences. We present an analysis of the strategy−proofness of non−resolute social choice rules when ...
متن کاملDomains of Social Choice Functions on Which Coalition Strategy-proofness and Maskin Monotonicity Are Equivalent
It is known that on some social choice and economic domains, a social choice function is coalition strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (e.g. Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977). This paper studies the foundation of those results. I provide a set of conditions which is sufficient for the equivalence between coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. This generalizes some ...
متن کاملObject allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics
We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties (unavailable-type-invariance, individual-rationality, weak non-wastefulness, or truncation-invariance)....
متن کاملMonotonicity Implies Strategy-Proofness for Correspondences
We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness property, thus generalizing Muller and Satterthwaite's (1977) theorem to correspondences. From the point of view of Nash implementation theory, the result yields a partial characterization of the restrictions entailed by Nash implementability. Alternatively, the resul...
متن کاملPriorities in the location of multiple public facilities
A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a pro le of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not su¤er from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of the class of rules satisfying Pareto-e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule...
متن کامل