Contracts for health care and asymmetric information.
نویسنده
چکیده
The paper presents a stylised model of contracting for a specific health service. The benefit of this service differs across patients. A purchaser, National Health Service (NHS, insurer) offers a contract to providers (hospitals, GP's), under the constraint of limited information about the provider's costs and the contract specifies the payment as a function of the number of cases treated. A number of features of the optimal contract are derived. Some of these are surprising: for example, the price per case generally increases with the efficiency of the provider.
منابع مشابه
Modelling and Experimental Testing of Asymmetric Information Problems in Lease and Hire Contracts (Based on Contract Theory)
This article aims to study lease and hiring contract in the Iranian-Islamic setting and analyze the asymmetric information problem in these contracts. For doing this, we study the characteristics of lease and hiring contracts in Iran (real world experimental characteristics that recognized in other studies), using library method, then we mathematically model different aspects of asymmetric info...
متن کاملAsymmetric Information in Iranian's Health Insurance Market: Testing of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.
BACKGROUND Asymmetric information is one of the most important issues in insurance market which occurred due to inherent characteristics of one of the agents involved in insurance contracts; hence its management requires designing appropriate policies. This phenomenon can lead to the failure of insurance market via its two consequences, namely, adverse selection and moral hazard. OBJECTIVE Th...
متن کاملLong-Term Care Insurance, Annuities and Asymmetric Information: The Case for Bundling Contracts.1
Within an asymmetric information set-up in which individuals di¤er in terms of their risk aversion and can choose whether or not to take preventative action, we illustrate in a uni ed framework the equilibrium possibilities with stand-alone long-term care insurance and annuity contracts. With costs of administering insurance, so that insurance is unfair, we show the existence of an equilibrium ...
متن کاملContract Design: The problem of information asymmetry
Introduction Integrated care systems are advocated as an effective method of improving the performance of healthcare systems. These systems outline a payment and care delivery model that intends to tie provider reimbursements to predefined quality metrics. Little is known about the contractual design and the main challenges of delegating "accountability" to these new kinds of organisations and/...
متن کاملTo love or to pay: On consumption, health and health care
People face heterogeneous health shocks and medical spending risks. Using a rich dynamic structural life-cycle model, this paper investigates how these shocks a¤ect the savings behavior of retired single households. Consumers are allowed to respond to health shocks in two different ways: they can directly pay for their health care expenses (self-insure) or they can rely on health insurance cont...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Journal of health economics
دوره 19 5 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2000