Callicott's Holism: A Clue for a Classical Realist Contribution to the Debate Over the Value of Animals

The occasion for this paper was an invitation from organizers of the Society for Classical Realism to participate in a special session, at the American Philosophical Association Central Division Conference, of the Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals. Implicit in this invitation was the idea that those interested in classical realism, ofwhich I am one, might make some contribution to the debate about the value of animals and, thereby, to the broader discussion of our actual obligations to the other-than-human aspects of nature. In this short essay I will offer some preliminary reflections on the philosophical foundations of the discussion of ethics and animals and conclude that classical realism as a philosophical style in fact lends itself to such foundational considerations. In my mind, not only can classical realists contribute positively to this important debate, but there is one particularly scholarly line of argument in this complex discussion that is especially compatible with the classical realist philosophical style. Moreover, J. Baird Callicott leaves a very rich clue for classical realists, in one of his well-known essays on environmental ethics. I will try to demonstrate shortly that this clue could help orient classical realists in their efforts to contribute to the discussion about ethics and animals. The essay to which I am referring is "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair."l The title betrays the primary purpose of the piece. Callicott argues that the debate over the liberation and rights of animals is not a bipolar one, as has often been maintained, but is, rather, three-sided. The three competing positions are, as Callicott distinguishes them, ethical or moral humanism, humane moralism, and environmental ethics. The ethical humanists argue that nonhuman animals are not worthy ofbeing accorded moral standing because "Only human beings are rational, or capable of having interests, or possess 'self'-awareness, or have linguistic abilities or can represent the future ...."2 This does not necessarily mean that animals may be treated inhumanely. Rather, animals may be treated as "means" and need not be treated as persons or ends in themselves. The humane moralists, on the other hand, argue against the ethical or moral humanists, claiming that even in lieu of possessing the aforesaid qualities that serve to constitute personhood, animals are "sentient" beings. Since animals possess "sensibility," it is argued that they suffer pain and that" ...we are morally obliged toconsider their suffering as much an evil to be minimized by conscientious moral agents as human suffering."3 While the ethical humanists and the humane moralists surely differ as to whether animals are beings who can