Minority shareholders’ protection in Romanian capital markets: evidence on dividends
نویسندگان
چکیده
Recent studies in Finance suggest dividends’ role as monitoring mechanism, which allows minority shareholders to control the managers or larger shareholders’ decisions. This paper tests this hypothesis on listed companies at Bucharest Stock Exchange, in 2000-2003 period, from the legislation perspective, but, also, using dividend ratios. Even the regulations and the enforcement of the law seem to guarantee an effective protection for minority shareholders, dividend policy is different from company to company, depending on shareholders structure. However, companies can fund their operations by banks, which could explain the relative indifference for minority shareholders proper treatment.
منابع مشابه
RRC V - 19 : “ Corporate Governance , Minority Shareholders and Shares Prices on Emerging Capital
The final results of this research project have been comprised within three main studies, which are mentioned below: • Dragotă, Victor, “Minority shareholders’ protection in Romanian capital markets: evidence on dividends”, published in Euro-Mediterranean Economics and Finance Review, January 2006, Vol. 1, No.1, pp. 76-89. • Dragotă, Victor; Dumitrescu, Dalina; Ruxanda, Gheorghe; Ciobanu, Anama...
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