Finding All Stable Matchings with Couples
نویسندگان
چکیده
In two-sided matching markets in which some doctors form couples, we present an algorithm that finds all the stable matchings whenever one exists, and otherwise shows that there is no stable matching. Extending the methodology of Echenique and Yenmez (2006), we characterize the set of stable matchings as the fixed points of a monotone decreasing function with respect to a certain partial order. Based on that result, an algorithm is presented that finds all the stable matchings, if any, in a market with couples. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers : C78, D71, J01.
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