What Normative Terms Mean and Why It Matters for Ethical eory*

is paper investigates how inquiry into normative language can improve substantive normative theorizing. First I examine twodimensions alongwhich normative language differs: “strength” and “subjectivity.” Next I show how greater sensitivity to these features of the meaning and use of normative language can illuminate debates about three issues in ethics: the coherence of moral dilemmas, the possibility of supererogatory acts, and the connection between making a normative judgment and being motivated to act accordingly. e paper concludes with several brief re ections on the theoretical utility of the distinction—at least so-called—between “normative” and “nonnormative” language and judgment. ediscussions of these speci c linguistic and normative issues can be seen as case studies illustrating the fruitfulness of utilizing resources from philosophy of language for normative theory. Getting clearer on the language we use in normative conversation and theorizing can help us diagnose problems with bad arguments and formulate better motivated questions. is can lead to clearer answers and bring into relief new theoretical possibilities and avenues to explore. *anks to Eric Swanson and the audience at the Fih Annual Arizona Normative Ethics Workshop for discussion, and to two anonymous referees for comments.