Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study the ex ante incentive compatible core, and provide conditions under which the ex ante incentive compatible core is nonempty when agents are informationally small in the sense of McLean and Postlewaite (2002a, Econometrica, 70, 2421–2453). 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C71; D51; D82
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 45 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003