Dynamic Monetary-Fiscal Interactions and the Role of Monetary Conservatism

The present paper reassesses the role of monetary conservatism in a setting with nominal government debt and endogenous fiscal policy. We assume that macroeconomic policies are chosen by monetary and fiscal policy makers who interact repeatedly but cannot commit to future actions. The real level of public liabilities is an endogenous state variable, and policies are chosen in a non-cooperative fashion. We focus on Markovperfect equilibria and investigate the role of fiscal impatience and monetary conservatism as determinants of the economy’s steady state and the associated welfare implications. Fiscal impatience creates a tendency of accumulating debt, and monetary conservatism actually exacerbates such excessive debt accumulation. Increased conservatism implies that any given level of real liabilities can be sustained at a lower rate of inflation. However, since this is internalized by the fiscal authority, the Markov-perfect equilibrium generates a steady state with higher indebtedness. As a result, increased monetary conservatism has adverse welfare implications. JEL classification: E61, E63, H21, H63