5 Less than lIleets the eye

Deliberative models have dominated democratic theory far the past ten years. This chapter argues that, in some prominent versions at least these models are funda­ mentally fla'wed. Criticism of the deliberative model is not new; ho\vever, few critics challenge the most basic assumptions of that model. preferring to argue on the ground set out by the deliberationists themselves. 1',,1y aim is to suggest that deliberative theory lacks basic coherence and consistency. and that it contains worrying elitist threads. The major shortcomings that I focus upon are: the models' claims to legitimacy; their reliance on metaphor; and their exclusiveness. I proceed by examining, in turn, legitimacy, the siting of deliberative democracy, the vvork of Cohen, and the Schumpeterian problem (especially as it is raised in the work of OfTe). First a word about the context of this critique. ~Iy present task is a negative one: elucidating the flaws in deliberative democracy. For my part, the more positive side of the story lies in regarding direct democracy as the best most defensible aspiration for the democratic future. If we. as democrats, are to take citizenship seriously and treat citizens equall)~ then democratic legitimacy can only properly be conceived of as voting for the outcomes olle prefers in the context of an 'open society'. Of course, appropriate deliberation is a good thing, useful \\'ithin a larger framevvork facilitating direct participation and decision. However, that deliberation is democratically secondary, a (difficult, complex) matter of tweaking more fundamental features of a defensible conception of democracy (see Saward 1998 fiJr an elaboration of this view, and Budge 1996 and in this volume tar compatible arguments).