Cake Cutting Really is Not a Piece of Cake and Balanced Allocations of Cake
نویسندگان
چکیده
From 24.06. to 29.06.2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07261 Fair Division was held in the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The rst section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available.
منابع مشابه
The Price of Indivisibility in Cake Cutting
We consider the problem of envy-free cake cutting, which is the distribution of a continuous heterogeneous resource among self interested players such that nobody prefers what somebody else receives to what they get. Existing work has focused on two distinct classes of solutions to this problem allocations which give each player a continuous piece of cake and allocations which give each player ...
متن کاملA Dictatorship Theorem for Cake Cutting
We consider discrete protocols for the classical Steinhaus cake cutting problem. Under mild technical conditions, we show that any deterministic strategy-proof protocol for two agents in the standard Robertson-Webb query model is dictatorial, that is, there is a fixed agent to which the protocol allocates the entire cake. For n > 2 agents, a similar impossibility holds, namely there always exis...
متن کاملTwo-player envy-free multi-cake division
We introduce a generalized cake-cutting problem in which we seek to divide multiple cakes so that two players may get their most-preferred piece selections: a choice of one piece from each cake, allowing for the possibility of linked preferences over the cakes. For two players, we show that disjoint envy-free piece selections may not exist for two cakes cut into two pieces each, and they may no...
متن کاملCake Cutting Mechanisms | Egor Ianovski
We examine the history of cake cutting mechanisms and discuss the efficiency of their allocations. In the case of piecewise uniform preferences, we define a game that in the presence of strategic agents has equilibria that are not dominated by the allocations of any mechanism. We identify that the equilibria of this game coincide with the allocations of an existing cake cutting mechanism.
متن کاملH R C C *
Fair cake-cutting is the division of a cake or resource among N users so that each user is content. Users may value a given piece of cake differently, and information about how a user values different parts of the cake can only be obtained by requesting users to “cut” pieces of the cake into specified ratios. Many distributed computing problems which involve resource sharing can be expressed as...
متن کامل