A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independet Types
نویسندگان
چکیده
We provide a simple proof of the equivalence between ex ante and ex post budget balance constraints in Bayesian mechanism design with independent types when participation decisions are made at the interim stage. The result is given an interpretation in terms of efficient allocation of risk. We thank Yoram Halevy, Martin Hellwig, Mike Peters, Phil Reny and Larry Samuelson for comments and helpful discussions. The usual disclaimer applies. Both authors are grateful to the Max Planck Institute for research on Collective Goods in Bonn for its hospitality. Peter Norman thanks SSHRC for financial assistance, and Tilman Börgers thanks the ESRC for financial assistance. Department of Economics, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, U.K, [email protected]. Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, 909-1873 East Mall, Vancouver, B.C. Canada V6T 1Z1, [email protected].
منابع مشابه
A Note on Budget Balance under Interim Participation Constraints: The Case of Independent Types
We provide a simple proof of the equivalence between ex ante and ex post budget balance constraints in Bayesian mechanism design with independent types when participation decisions are made at the interim stage. The result is given an interpretation in terms of efficient allocation of risk.
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