The New Political Economy of Taxation in Advanced Capitalist Democracies
نویسندگان
چکیده
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-5, Atlanta, GA, and the 2000 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 27-30, Chicago, IL. The authors thank Steffen Ganghof, Philip Genschel, Mark Hallerberg, Alex Hicks, William Keech, Dennis Quinn, and the anonymous reviewers and editor of this journal for many helpful comments and Dennis Quinn for generously sharing data. Duane Swank thanks the German Marshal Fund of the United States and Marquette University for support of work incorporated in this paper. Data utilized in this paper are available from duane. [email protected].
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