Coalition formation with local public goods and group-size effect
نویسنده
چکیده
Many public goods that are provided by coalitions have a group-size e¤ect. Namely, people prefer to consume a public good in a larger coalition. This paper studies local public goods games with anonymous and separable group-size e¤ect. The core is nonempty when coalition feasible sets are monotonic and playerspreferences over public goods satisfy a condition called cardinal connectedness. Moreover, a core allocation consists of connected coalitions. JEL Classi cation: C71, D71, H41.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 39 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010