Prisoner ’ s Dilemma with Talk ∗

Satisficing and Learning Cooperation in the Prisoner s Dilemma

Compensating the cooperators : Is sorting in the prisoner ' s dilemma possible ?

Nash Equilibria in Stabilizing Systems

The main objective of this paper is to argue that Nash equilibria, which were introduced as termination criteria of games [1], can be used to discourage malicious perturbations in stabilizing distributed systems. But let us start, from the beginning, by describing how a Nash equilibrium can be used as a termination criterion for a well-known game called the two-prisoner dilemma [2]. Consider a ...

Adaptive Behaviour for Prisoner Dilemma Strategies Based on Automata with Multiplicities

This paper presents the use of automata with multiplicities for the modelization of agent behaviours. Genetic algorithms can be defined on their probabilistic forms and are able to simulate adaptive behaviours. An application to a simulation of evolutive strategies in game theory is presented, specifically for the prisoner dilemma which is considered as a basic model of dynamic agents interacti...

Sustaining Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma with Local Interaction

This paper studies the repeated prisoner’s dilemma in a local interaction setup. We construct a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies that sustains cooperation for sufficiently patient players. The notion of sequential equilibrium is extended to extensive form games with inÞnite time horizon. The strategy is embedded in an explicitly deÞned expectation system, which may also be viewed as a ...