On Maternal Obligation: the Lens of Motherhood in the Abortion Debate

In this essay, I will evaluate the arguments put forth on the subject of “maternal obligation,” or those actions that a pregnant mother may (or may not) owe to the de­ veloping fetus within her body. I will compare those arguments of Margaret Little, who claims that mothers deserve more autonomy in determining maternal obligation based on the principles of stewardship and the norms of creation; and those arguments of Patrick Lee and Robert George, who claim that a mother has an obligation to gestate a fetus under most circumstances. For clarity of subject matter, “personhood” and all rights that belong to a “person” will be assumed to belong to the child at the moment of concep­ tion, although I am not primarily concerned with this scientific matter. In my view, the personhood argument bears little weight when compared to arguments on the decision to protect or destroy that personhood via abortion. These arguments, once clarified, reveal an interesting conflict between the ethics of creation and the ethics of destruction. This conflict is fundamental to the debate on the moral permissibility of abortion, particularly concerning whether we ought to be more concerned for the welfare of the mother and child physically, or the social and emotional state of the mother and growing child after birth. Ultimately, Little presents the more persuasive and compelling argument to support the claim that the moral duty to gestate a fetus is up to the mother due to the contingent nature of intimate relationships. According to Margaret Little, the moral permissibility of abortion is contingent on the argument that gestation, and therefore pregnancy, is a bodily intimacy between child and mother.1 The commitment of motherhood, whether the pregnancy was brought on through non-consensual sex or invited as the result of sexual behavior, is not a binding promise the mother makes with her child, but it should always be conducted with the mother’s careful and inquiring consent. Consider Little’s analogy of the Perfect Groom, who would perfectly suit the family’s desires with mutual benefits to all. He is a groom with a high income, universally attractive characteristics, and his parents come from a high social class with great social capital to support the woman and her future family for life: All of this utility notwithstanding, many will believe that you do not have a moral obligation to accept the proposal. You might have a responsibility to give the proposal a serious thought; but if, on reflection, you realize that marriage to this man—or, to any man—is not what you want, then there we are.2