Work incentives and household insurance: Sequential contracting with altruistic individuals and moral hazard∗
نویسنده
چکیده
Two agents sequentially contracts with different principals under moral hazard. If agents care for one another, the second principal gains by insuring them over first wages. Even with independent tasks, the first principal must offer riskier payments to induce effort. JEL Codes: D10, D64, D82.
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