Cryptanalysis of Syverson's Rational Exchange Protocol
نویسندگان
چکیده
The notion of rational exchange introduced by Syverson in 1998 is a particularly interesting alternative when an efficient scheme for fair exchange is required but the existence of a trusted third party simply cannot be assumed. A rational exchange protocol cannot provide true fairness, but it ensures that rational –i.e. self-interested– parties would have no reason to deviate from the protocol. In this paper, we identify some weaknesses in Syverson’s rational exchange protocol which were neither detected by the original author nor by subsequent analysis. After presenting some attacks, we indicate how the scheme should be modified to overcome these vulnerabilities. We also provide a formal analysis of our enhancement using BAN logic.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- I. J. Network Security
دوره 7 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008