Post - Sale Duty to Warn Is the Door Opening for Plaintiffs ?

learns or should have learned of the risk created by its fault.” Jablonski v. Ford Motor Co., 955 N.E.2d 1138, 1159 (Ill. 2011) (emphasis added). See also Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 99 N.W.2d 627, 634 (Mich. 1959); Kozlowski v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 275 N.W.2d 915, 922 (Wis. 1979); Downing v. Overhead Door Corp., 707 P.2d 1027, 1032 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Wilson v. U.S. Elevator Corp., 972 P.2d 235, 237-38 (Ariz. 1998); Jones v. Bowie Industries, Inc., 282 P.3d 316, 334 (AK 2012). However, an issue arises when the manufacturer or seller subsequently learns of a latent defect in its product that could not have been reasonably known at the time of sale. Section 10 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability suggests imposing on the seller, in this instance, a postsale duty to warn. Put simply, a post-sale duty to warn places a burden on the seller to inform consumers of its products’ dangers that become apparent to the seller after sale. Because this duty takes into account what actions a reasonable seller would take after the product has left its control, the post-sale duty to warn is a negligencebased standard. Contrast this to the point-of-sale duty to warn, which only emphasizes whether a defect existed at the time it left the control of the seller or manufacturer and thus has its basis in strict liability. This potential post-sale duty has important implications for manufacturers and sellers because it places upon them a potentially onerous responsibility to their consumers, exposing them to liability for dangers discovered months, and even years, after the product has left their control. This article discusses the developments in the adoption or rejection of the post-sale duty to warn. In particular, we consider what effect, if any, Section 10 has or will have on the adoption of the duty, and whether courts have been receptive to the standards suggested by the Restatement.