The Robustness of Incomplete Penal Codes in Repeated Interactions
نویسنده
چکیده
We study the robustness of equilibria with regards to small payoff perturbations of the dynamic game. We find that complete penal codes, that specify player’s strategies after every history, can have at best limited robustness and may even fail to exist for some games. We define incomplete penal codes as partial descriptions of equilibrium strategies. We construct incomplete penal codes that are robust to perturbations of the game dynamics. These codes generate a Folk Theorem in a class of stochastic games with incomplete information.
منابع مشابه
When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games∗
In repeated normal-form games, simple penal codes (Abreu 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. We provide two examples illustrating that a subgame-perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property that the continuation play after a deviation is...
متن کاملWhen and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime
In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of settings in which a subgame-perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property tha...
متن کاملShould equilibria require that players are uninformed? Arguing against the Trigger Strategy and Simple Optimal Penal Code in Repeated Matching Games
In repeated matching games trigger strategies and simple optimal penal codes are not equilibria unless strong informational assumptions are made. If only local information is used by the strategy and other weak information ows are allowed both strategies fail.
متن کاملVolker Nocke , and Lucy White “ When and
In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of settings in which a subgame-perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property tha...
متن کاملAn Investigation into Kefa’at in Religion from the Perspective of the Quran, Narrations, Islamic Jurisprudence and Law With an Emphasis on Islamic Penal Codes of 1991 and 2013
The Islamic Penal Code adopted in 2013 on the issue of the kefa’at (sufficiency of reasons) of murderer and the murdered in religion has undergone some changes in comparison to the Islamic Penal Code of 2001. The legislator's approach in the new law is to remove the ambiguities of the former one about the issue in question and, therefore, in Articles 301, 310 and 311 of the new law, many of the...
متن کامل