Optimal Mechanism Design without Money
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider the standard mechanism design environment with linear utility but without monetary transfers. We establish an equivalence between deterministic, dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms and generalized median voter schemes, and we use this equivalence to characterize the constrained-efficient optimal mechanism for an utilitarian planner. ∗Gershkov: Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel and School of Economics, University of Surrey, UK, [email protected]; Moldovanu: Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Germany, [email protected]; Shi: Department of Economics, University of Toronto, Canada, [email protected].
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