Empirical ethics: who is the Don Quixote?

‘Empirical ethics’ is a broad term that is used in many different and, often, unclear ways. Such vagueness has disadvantages: it can make discussion difficult. However, ambiguity also offers opportunities to explore and negotiate the multiple meanings of the emerging practice of ‘empirical ethics’. An increasing number of authors refer to their work as ‘empirical ethics’, yet most of them are not explicit about what they mean, either theoretically or practically, by ‘empirical ethics’. Where does ‘empirical ethics’ start and where does it finish? Do we need criteria to define and assess the quality of empirical ethical work, and if so, which ones are most appropriate? In effect, what is empirical ethics? Empirical ethics is sometimes a battlefield. Both proponents and opponents do not always know who or what they are fighting. Consequently, both sides can be seen as Don Quixotes, unsure if they are fighting benign windmills or dangerous giants who torture the basic foundations of ethics and philosophy. Knowing what empirical ethics can and should be; what could be considered good practice in empirical ethics; and which issues still need further clarification, will help to foster a more constructive discussion. This special issue of Bioethics on ‘empirical ethics’ emerged for three main reasons. First, we think that the ideas and practice of ‘empirical ethics’ challenge some of the core foundations of ethics, such as the idea that ethical principles must be first established and then applied to practice and that authoritative knowledge is to be found in ethical theories. This challenge has not yet been fully explored and articulated. Second, empirical ethics tries to take into account and combine two of our most important sources of knowledge within bioethics: moral theory and experience and/or empirical data. Some authors who engage in the field of ‘empirical ethics’ do not sufficiently articulate and justify their view of this relationship. Therefore, we think that the stances taken on the relationship between these two sources of knowledge need to be more fully debated. Third, without a clear rationale behind the use of empirical research in moral reasoning, there could be concerns over the quality and the utility of the work conducted under the heading ‘empirical ethics’. This issue of Bioethics offers papers which will challenge some of our views on ‘empirical ethics’ and which will, hopefully, help advance the debate over the relationship between moral theory and empirical data and/or experience. This special issue of Bioethics examines two main questions: 1) What are appropriate and inappropriate uses of empirical research within bioethics? and 2) What is needed theoretically and practically to ensure that empirical research is used fruitfully in both bioethics and practice? The aim of this special edition was to examine both the quality of ‘the’ field of empirical ethics itself and the debate over empirical ethics by bringing together papers from both opponents and advocates of the ‘empirical turn’. We made an open call for papers and largely received papers that were, in principal, receptive to the possibility and the importance of ‘empirical ethics’. It would have been useful to have also received papers that were unsympathetic to this movement, to offer a critique and alternative view of this development. In light of this, the editors of Bioethics (Ruth Chadwick and Udo Schuklenk) invite people to respond to the papers in this special edition and offer such a critique of this movement. This notwithstanding, we are happy that we received so many interesting papers with different views on what empirical ethics is and what it should look like in practice. The authors of the papers use different languages (discourses) and plead for different kinds of ‘empirical ethics’ based on contrasting and sometimes even opposing views. Often, confusion and disagreement is related not only to different theoretical views but also to the absence of a shared and more fluid, relational language (e.g. imagine a language in which facts and values, the descriptive and the normative are not seen as two separate entities). You will find these differences in discourse and struggles over particular issues reflected in the papers published in this issue. The polyvocality and richness of ideas shows that ‘empirical ethics’ is a challenging and interesting domain in which meta-ethical and interdisciplinary issues can be discussed. Although this issue of Bioethics will not (and should not aim to) clarify and solve all theoretical and practical issues raised by ‘empirical ethics’, it can be seen as a step forward in the direction of an inter-, or even trans-disciplinary field that is still developing its identity. Before we introduce the papers we would like to thank the reviewers who gave generously of their time and expertise and the editors of Bioethics for giving us the opportunity to do this special edition. The first paper in this issue is by Rob De Vries and Bert Gordijn, (Empirical Ethics and its Alleged Bioethics ISSN 0269-9702 (print); 1467-8519 (online) Volume 23 Number 4 2009 pp ii–iv