Truthful Fair Division
نویسندگان
چکیده
We address the problem of fair division, or cake cutting, with the goal of finding truthful mechanisms. In the case of a general measure space (“cake”) and non-atomic, additive individual preference measures or utilities we show that there exists a truthful “mechanism” which ensures that each of the k players gets at least 1/k of the cake. This mechanism also minimizes risk for truthful players. Furthermore, in the case where there exist at least two different measures we present a different truthful mechanism which ensures that each of the players gets more than 1/k of the cake. We then turn our attention to partitions of indivisible goods with bounded utilities and a large number of goods. Here we provide similar mechanisms, but with slightly weaker guarantees. These guarantees converge to those obtained in the non-atomic case as the number of goods goes to infinity.
منابع مشابه
Mechanism Design for Fair Division
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