Sun Wars: Competition
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
میزانسنجی تاثیر عنصر رقابت بر جنگهای نیابتی ایران و عربستان
Arabia considers Iran the main source of instability in the region and believes that Iran seeks to dominate the Sunni Arabs through creating Shiite crescent. Especially after the Islamic Revolution, two countries have been as the rivals in the Persian Gulf. Ideological competition is considered as the core of competition in the areas of geopolitics, geostrategics and geoeconomics. In recent yea...
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