Private Information: Similarity as Compatibility
نویسندگان
چکیده
We investigate the continuity of equilibrium in differential information economies with a finite number of agents. In this setting, agents can make contingent contracts based on events that are commonly observed. With private information modeled as finite partitions of a compact and metrizable space of states of nature, we introduce a topology on information that evaluates the similarity between private information fields taking into account their compatibility. This topology allows us to establish upper semicontinuity of the private core correspondence.
منابع مشابه
Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies
We introduce several efficiency notions depending on what kind of expected utility is used (ex ante, interim, ex post) and on how agents share their private information, i.e., whether they redistribute their initial endowments based on their own private information, or common knowledge information, or pooled information. Moreover, we introduce several Bayesian incentive compatibility notions an...
متن کاملPerfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives
The idea of perfect competition for an economy with asymmetric information is formalized via an idiosyncratic signal process in which the private signals of almost every individual agent can influence only a negligible group of agents, and the individual agents’ relevant signals are essentially pairwise independent conditioned on the true states of nature. Thus, there is no incentive for an ind...
متن کاملA Semantic Similarity Measure for Semantic Web Services
Establishing the compatibility of services is an essential prerequisite to service composition. By formally defining the similarity of semantic services, useful information can be obtained about their compatibility. In this paper we propose a metric for measuring the similarity of semantic services annotated with OWL ontology. Similarity is calculated by defining the intrinsic information value...
متن کاملInformational size and two-stage mechanisms
We showed in McLean and Postlewaite (2014) that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modi cations to VCG mechanisms in interdependent value problems that restore incentive compatibility. This paper presents a two-stage mechanism that similarly restores incentive compatibility. The rst stage essentially elicits that part of the agentsprivate information that induces interde...
متن کاملIncomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core
We consider an exchange economy in which agents possess private information at the time of engaging in state contingent contracts. While communication of private information is permitted, the true information state is not verifiable. The enforcement of contracts is, therefore, limited by incentive compatibility constraints. We formalize a notion of the core for such an economy. Our analysis can...
متن کامل