Welfare, Autonomy, and the Autonomy Fallacy

In this paper, I subject the claim that autonomous choice is an intrinsic welfare benefit to critical scrutiny. My argument begins by discussing perhaps the most influential argument in favor of the intrinsic value of autonomy: the argument from deference. In response, I hold that this argument displays what I call the ‘Autonomy Fallacy’: the argument from deference has no power to support the intrinsic value of autonomy in comparison to the important evaluative significance of bare self-direction (autonomous or not) or what I call ‘self-direction tout court ’. I defend the claim that the Autonomy Fallacy really is a fallacy, and show that my examination of the argument from deference has wider reverberations. Once we clearly distinguish between autonomy and self-direction tout court, it becomes much less plausible to say that autonomy of itself is an intrinsic welfare benefit. Human beings—for the most part, anyway—are autonomous creatures. And it’s a good thing, too. The exercise of autonomy is plausibly essential to much of what is valuable in life: the fulfillment of our desires, plans, and projects, and the pursuit of our interests in a prudentially rational manner. Without autonomy, we would be unable to shape our lives in a way we see fit, or—if that is different—in a way that is best for us. In addition to the obvious instrumental value that autonomy provides, some have come to view the exercise of autonomy as intrinsically valuable, a per se welfare benefit in its own right. In this paper, I challenge this view. I argue that the intrinsic value of autonomy is only plausible when we confuse the value of autonomy with the value of other related, but distinct, features of a life well-lived. The plan of this paper runs as follows. In the first section, I discuss two preliminary matters, including the precise claim about well-being I wish to dispute, and the nature of autonomy under discussion here. In the second section I discuss perhaps the most influential argument in favor of the intrinsic value of autonomy: the argument from deference. In response, I hold that this argument displays what I call the ‘Autonomy Fallacy’: the argument from deference has no power to support the intrinsic value of autonomy in comparison to the important evaluative significance of bare self-direction (autonomous or not) or what I call ‘self-direction tout court ’. In the remaining sections I defend the claim that the Autonomy Fallacy really is a