Misrepresentation and Stability in the Marriage Problem
نویسنده
چکیده
It has been shown previously that, for two-sided discrete markets of the kind exemplified by the “marriage problem,” no strategy-proof procedure for aggregating preferences into stable outcomes exists. Here it is shown that (Nash) equilibrium misrepresentation of preferences nevertheless results in a stable outcome in terms of the true preferences when the aggregation procedure yields the optimal stable outcome in terms of the stated preferences for one side of the market. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 022, 025. 026.
منابع مشابه
The Problem of Customary Marriage and the Solution of Temporary Marriage
Customary marriage (nikāḥ ‘urfī)—non-official married life of a couple—is a new phenomenon increasingly spreading throughout the Arab world. Legal and social consequences of customary marriage have led many socio-jurisprudential scholars to forbid all its varieties. The strategy has, nevertheless, failed to restrain the spread of this type of marriage. In this paper, I argue that one f...
متن کاملStrategic Behavior in Matching Markets
Centralized two-sided markets, such as the market for medical residents, often rely on a stable matching mechanism to determine a matching between participants. Because no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is always some room in these markets for strategic misrepresentation. In this paper we study optimal strategic misrepresent...
متن کاملThe Role of Couples’ Families in adjustment, Stability and Marital Satisfaction of Spouses: A review study
Marriage, as one of the most important stages in the family, has the influence and participation of parents. Recent studies show that different aspects of couples' marital relationships are affected by their families and change their quality of life. The purpose of this study is to provide a clear picture of the different dimensions of the role and effectiveness of couples' families in marital ...
متن کاملThe Sociological Study of the Factors Affecting Marriage Age Increase among Guivi City's Girls in 2013
Family as the smallest and the most fundamental structure of the society forms the basis and foundation of the society and in the meantime marriage itself can be considered as the basis and foundation of the family. Considering the importance of marriage, changing and transitions and creating disorder in the process of the marriage is a social problem which may be affected both the basis of the...
متن کاملOrdinal invariance in multicoalitional bargaining
A multicoalitional bargaining problem is a non-transferable utility game and for each coalition, a bargaining rule. We look for ordinally invariant solutions to such problems and discover a subrule of Bennett’s (1997, Games Econ. Behav. 19, 151–179) that satisfies the property. On a subclass of problems that is closely related to standard bargaining problems and allocation problems with majorit...
متن کامل