Online Appendix for Kamei and Putterman , 2013 “ In Broad Daylight : Fuller Information and Higher - order Punishment Opportunities
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In Broad Daylight: Fuller Information and Higher-Order Punishment Opportunities Can Promote Cooperation
The expectation that non-cooperators will be punished can help to sustain cooperation, but there are competing claims about whether opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment (punishing punishment or failure to punish) help or undermine cooperation in social dilemmas. Varying treatments of a voluntary contributions experiment, we find that availability of higher-order punishment opportu...
متن کاملIn broad daylight : Full information and higher - order punishment opportunities promote cooperation
The expectation that non-cooperators will be punished can help to sustain cooperation, but there are competing claims about whether opportunities to engage in higher-order punishment (punishing punishment or failure to punish) help or undermine cooperation in social dilemmas. In a set of experimental treatments, we find that availability of higherorder punishment increases cooperation and effic...
متن کاملOn perverse and second-order punishment in public goods experiments with decentralized sanctioning
The fact that many people take it upon themselves to impose costly punishment on free riders helps to explain why collective action sometimes succeeds despite the prediction of received theory. But while individually imposed sanctions lead to higher contributions in public goods experiments, there is usually little or no net efficiency gain from them, because punishment is costly and at times m...
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The fact that many people take it upon themselves to impose costly punishment on free riders helps to explain why collective action sometimes succeeds despite the prediction of received theory. But while individually imposed sanctions lead to higher contributions in public goods experiments, there is usually little or no net efficiency gain from them, because punishment is costly and at times m...
متن کاملPlay It Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning in Restarting, Finitely-repeated Dilemma Games
Previous research has shown that opportunities for two-sided partner choice in finitely repeated social dilemma games can promote cooperation through a combination of sorting and opportunistic signaling, with late period defections by selfish players causing an end-game decline. How such experience would affect play of subsequent finitely-repeated games remains unclear. In each of six treatment...
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