A quantitative genetic model of reciprocal altruism: a condition for kin or group selection to prevail.

نویسنده

  • K Aoki
چکیده

A condition is derived for reciprocal altruism to evolve by kin or group selection. It is assumed that many additively acting genes of small effect and the environment determine the probability that an individual is a reciprocal altruist, as opposed to being unconditionally selfish. The particular form of reciprocal altruism considered is TIT FOR TAT, a strategy that involves being altruistic on the first encounter with another individual and doing whatever the other did on the previous encounter in subsequent encounters with the same individual. Encounters are restricted to individuals of the same generation belonging to the same kin or breeding group, but first encounters occur at random within that group. The number of individuals with which an individual interacts is assumed to be the same within any kin or breeding group. There are 1 + i expected encounters between two interacting individuals. On any encounter, it is assumed that an individual who behaves altruistically suffers a cost in personal fitness proportional to c while improving his partner's fitness by the same proportion of b. Then, the condition for kin or group selection to prevail is [Formula: see text] if group size is sufficiently large and the group mean and the within-group genotypic variance of the trait value (i.e., the probability of being a TIT-FOR-TAT strategist) are uncorrelated. Here, C, Vb, and Tb are the population mean, between-group variance, and between-group third central moment of the trait value and r is the correlation between the additive genotypic values of interacting kin or of individuals within the same breeding group. The right-hand side of the above inequality is monotone decreasing in C if we hold Tb/Vb constant, and kin and group selection become superfluous beyond a certain threshold value of C. The effect of finite group size is also considered in a kin-selection model.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Evolution of Cooperation: Combining Kin Selection and Reciprocal Altruism into Matrix Games with Social Dilemmas

Darwinian selection should preclude cooperation from evolving; yet cooperation is widespread among organisms. We show how kin selection and reciprocal altruism can promote cooperation in diverse 2×2 matrix games (prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift, and hawk-dove). We visualize kin selection as non-random interactions with like-strategies interacting more than by chance. Reciprocal altruism emerges f...

متن کامل

Modelling Reciprocal Altruism

Biologists rely extensively on the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game to model reciprocal altruism. After examining the informal conditions necessary for reciprocal altruism, I argue that formal games besides the standard iterated Prisoner's Dilemma meet these conditions. One alternate representation, the modified^Prisoner's Dilemma game, removes a standard but unnecessary condition; the other ga...

متن کامل

Coalition factor in the evolution of non-kin altruism

Animal behavior is often altruistic. In the frame of the theory of natural selection, altruism can only exist under specific conditions like kin selection or reciprocal cooperation. We show that reciprocal cooperation, which is generally invoked to explain non-kin altruism, requires very restrictive conditions to be stable. Some of these conditions are not met in many cases of altruism observed...

متن کامل

Group 1: The Role of Cognition and Emotion in Cooperation

Altruism, behavior which reduces the individual fitness of the actor while increasing the fitness 7 of another organism, has attracted much attention from both biologists and economists because it 8 seems to defy the logic of both natural selection and standard preferences. In biology, kin 9 selection (Hamilton 1964) is the best-established explanation of the evolution and maintenance 10 of alt...

متن کامل

Reciprocal altruism, rather than kin selection, maintains nepotistic food transfers on an Ache reservation ¬リニ

Cooperation among relatives is often regarded as evidence of kin selection. Yet altruism not requiring shared genes can also evolve among relatives. If characteristics of relatives (such as proximity, familiarity, or trust) make kin preferred social partners, the primary causes of nepotistic biases may reside principally in direct fitness payoffs from cooperation rather than indirect fitness pa...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

دوره 80 13  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 1983