Buy-price English auction

نویسندگان

  • Zoltán Hidvégi
  • Wenli Wang
  • Andrew B. Whinston
چکیده

In English auctions, introducing a buy price, i.e., the seller’s maximum price bid at which any bidder at any time can immediately win the auction, allows the seller to gain higher expected utility than that in a traditional auction when either the seller or the buyers are risk-averse. If the seller sets the buy price high enough, the buyprice English auction is efficient and guarantees the highest bidder wins. Under this condition, the expected utilities of uniformly risk-averse buyers with CARA utilities remain the same as in a traditional auction, and the buy-price and traditional auctions are revenue equivalent when both the seller and the buyers are risk neutral. A bidder with a valuation above the buy price follows one of three possible pure strategies: If his valuation is very high, he would use the buy price unconditionally without trying to observe other bidders; If his valuation is relatively high, he would use the buy price on the condition that there exists another competing bidder; Otherwise, he would use the buy price when the current high bid reaches a threshold level between the reserve and the buy price.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Buy prices in online auctions : irrationality on the internet ? *

Buy prices are puzzling: it makes sense for a seller at auction to set a minimum bidding level (i.e., a reserve price), surely, but a maximum? We explore the use of maximum bidding levels (buy prices) in online auctions and provide a rational explanation for this seemingly irrational auction mechanism. We show that augmenting an English auction with a buy price can improve the seller’s profits ...

متن کامل

When Auction Meets Fixed Price: A Theoretical and Empirical Examination of Buy-it-Now Auctions

Recently fixed pricing and auctions have been brought together in a new pricing format that offers bidders the option of prematurely ending an auction at a fixed price. The growing popularity of auctions presents an interesting pricing decision for managers: whether to sell at a fixed price, in a regular auction, or through a buy-it-now auction. This paper studies eBay’s buy-it-now auction and ...

متن کامل

Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences

In an auction with a buy price, the seller provides bidders with an option to end the auction early by accepting a transaction at a posted price. The ”BuyIt-Now” option on eBay is a leading example of an auction with a buy price. This paper develops a model of an auction with a buy price in which bidders use the auction’s reserve price and buy price to formulate a reference price. The model bot...

متن کامل

Buy-Out Prices in Auctions: Seller Competition and Multi-Unit Demands*

Online auction sites often enable sellers to add a buy-out price. In one-shot auctions, this has been motivated by appeal to impatience or risk aversion. We offer additional justification in a dynamic model, by showing that an early seller has an incentive to use a buy-out price, if a similar product is offered later by another seller, and bidders desire multiple objects. Revenue in the first a...

متن کامل

Posted price selling and online auctions

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t JEL classification: C70 D44 D61 Keywords: Online auctions Posted price selling Buy-it-now Allocative inefficiency Random matching eBay auctions In an auction-style listing at eBay, sellers have the option to set a posted price (also known as buy-it-now price), which allows buyers to instantly purchase an item before the start of the auction. This paper prov...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • J. Economic Theory

دوره 129  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2006