The Effects of Downstream Distributor Chains on Upstream Producer Entry: A Bargaining Perspective

نویسندگان

  • Suchan Chae
  • Paul Heidhues
چکیده

The Effects of Downstream Distributor Chains on Upstream Producer Entry: A Bargaining Perspective by Suchan Chae and Paul Heidhues This paper studies the effects of integration among downstream local distributors on the entry of upstream producers in a bargaining theoretic framework. We show that integration of downstream distributors may increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis upstream producers and thus lower incentives for entry in the upstream production industry. In order to explain price formation in such a market, we use a bargaining solution that generalizes the Nash solution. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Die Auswirkungen von überregionalen Zusammenschlüssen zwischen Händlern auf den Eintritt von Inputproduzenten: Eine verhandlungstheoretische Analyse Ausgehend von Industrien mit hohen Fixkosten und vernachlässigbaren Grenzkosten (z. B. Filmund Fernsehindustrie, Softwareindustrie, Pharmazeutische Industrie) wird untersucht wie sich überregionale Zusammenschlüsse zwischen "downstream distributors" (z. B. Kinos, Kabelbetreiber, Einzelhändler, Krankenhäuser bzw. Krankenkassen) auf die Angebotsvielfalt auswirken. Aus verhandlungstheoretischer Sicht werden dazu in diesem Beitrag die Auswirkungen von überregionalen Zusammenschlüssen zwischen lokalen "downstream distributors" auf den Eintritt von Inputpoduzenten untersucht . Es wird gezeigt wie überregionale Zusammenschlüsse von "distributors" deren Verhandlungsmacht gegenüber Inputproduzenten erhöhen können und damit die Anreize zum Eintritt in die Inputindustrie verringern können. Hierzu verwendet dieser Beitrag eine verallgemeinerte Nash-Verhandlungslösung, um die Preisbildung auf dem Inputmarkt zu analysieren.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Upstream mergers, downstream mergers, and secret vertical contracts

In an industry characterised by secret vertical contracts, we consider a benchmark case where two vertical chains exist, with two upstream manufacturers selling to two downstream retailers, and show that the equilibrium prices are independent of whether upstream or downstream ̄rms have all the bargaining power. We then analyse two alternative mergers, and show that a downstream merger (which gi...

متن کامل

Analyzing the 60-day low flow from upstream to downstream in the Karkeh Basin

Knowing how the low flow changes upstream and its trend provides valuable information on water resources management, water rights, and the improvement of crop patterns. It also helps to identify suitable areas for water control management along the river from water resources management perspective. In addition to economic issues, the preservation of river ecosystems is an important matter that ...

متن کامل

Downstream merger and welfare in a bilateral oligopoly

I analyse the effects of a downstream merger in a differentiated oligopoly when there is bargaining between downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). Bargaining outcomes can be observable or unobservable by rivals. When competition is in quantities, upstream agents are independent and bargaining is over a uniform input price, a merger between downstream firms may raise consumer su...

متن کامل

Analysis of the Inter-Basin Water Transfer Project from the Halilrood upstream with consideration of downstream effects

  Abstract Given the importance of water resources in sustainable development, it is necessary to investigate the direct and indirect impacts of inter-basin water transfer projects. The present research analyzed the status of the water resources in the south of Kerman province and the challenges of inter-basin water transfer that will result from transferring water from the upstream Halilroo...

متن کامل

Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration

This paper analyzes the effect of competition among downstream Žrms on an upstream Žrm’s payoff and on its incentive to integrate vertically when Žrms in both segments negotiate optimal contracts. We argue that as downstream competition becomes more intense, the upstream Žrm obtains a larger share of a smaller downstream industry proŽt. The upstream Žrm may encourage downstream competition (eve...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 1999