Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions
نویسندگان
چکیده
1 This work was done while George Mailath and Larry Samuelson were visiting the University of Bonn, whose hospitality is gratefully acknowldeged. We thank Ken Binmore for helpful discussions. This is a revision of Section 2 of Mailath, Samuelson, and Shaked [2]. Financial support from the National Science Foundation and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Sonderforschungsbereich 303 at the University of Bonn, is gratefully acknowledged. Summary. This paper shows that Nash equilibria of a local-interaction game are equivalent to correlated equilibria of the underlying game.
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