Media Barons on the Ballot: Politically-Controlled Broadcasting in Brazil∗

Does the rise of commercial mass media threaten or enhance the power of traditional political bosses in developing democracies? While access to outside information might increase political competition or prompt voters to reject corrupt politicians, bosses who can dominate local broadcasters may see an electoral benefit. I test this hypothesis by exploiting geographical variation in the coverage of radio and television stations with ties to Brazilian candidates for state and federal deputy. Using a spatial difference-in-differences estimator combined with matching, I compare the electoral boost that media-controlling candidates receive within range of their stations to any boost or deficit for similar candidates without media control. Ties to broadcast media bring substantial benefits—around 13 percentage points of the vote—within municipalities where signals can be received. The effect is driven almost entirely by FM radio stations, which are easier than television for individual politicians to dominate. ∗Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 3–6, 2014. Thanks to F. Daniel Hidalgo and seminar participants at Boston University for comments on a previous version.