Ascribing Knowledge in Context : Some Objections to the Contextualist ’ s Solution to Skepticism

changed shape numerous times, thus making it difficult to combat a general skeptical problem. Contemporarily, the dilemma is structured in the form of the skeptical hypothesis (SH), and it is this formulation that is the focus of this paper. The core element of the skeptical hypothesis is the possibility of a delusion (D) that is irreconcilable with some ordinary empirical proposition (O) that one allegedly knows. The delusion may be that “I am dreaming” (Descartes), “I am a brain in a vat” (Putnam), or “zebras are actually cleverly painted mules” (Dretske). Equally, the empirical propositions that I claim ordinarily to know might include “I am standing,” “I have hands,” and “zebras are not actually cleverly painted mules.” The skeptical hypothesis (SH) can be expressed in three parts: