Environmental Levies, Distortionary Taxation and Increasing Returns
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this note, we introduce increasing returns to Bovenberg and Mooij’s (1994) model as generalised in Fullerton (1997) and use an example to show that (1) even with a distortionary labor tax, the optimal environmental levy is greater than the Pigouvian rate; (2) the difference between tax on the “dirty” good and the “clean” good is also greater than the Pigouvian tax; (3) under certain circumstances, the government can optimally use the environmental levy to both meet its revenue requirement and subsidize the “clean” goods with increasing returns. JEL classification: H23
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