A Behavioral Arrow Theorem
نویسندگان
چکیده
In light of research indicating that individual behavior may violate standard rationality assumptions, we introduce a model of preference aggregation in which neither individual nor collective preferences must satisfy transitivity or other coherence conditions. We introduce an ordinal rationality measure to compare preference relations in terms of their level of coherence. Using this measure, we introduce a new axiom, monotonicity, which requires the collective preference to become more rational when the individual preferences become more rational. We show that no collective choice rule satisfies monotonicity and the standard Arrovian assumptions: unrestricted domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and nondictatorship.
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