Uniform selection in global games

نویسنده

  • Sylvain Chassang
چکیده

This paper brings together results which are required in order to extend the global games approach to settings where the game structure is endogenous. More precisely, it shows that the selection argument of Carlsson and van Damme [2] holds uniformly over appropriately controlled families of games. Those results also give proper justification for the inversion of limits which is often implicit in applied work taking comparative statics on the selected risk-dominant equilibrium. keywords: global games, equilibrium selection, uniform selection, comparative statics, endogenous games jel classification codes : C72, C73 ∗I am deeply indebted to Abhijit Banerjee, Casey Rothschild and Muhamet Yildiz for many helpful discussions. †E-mail : [email protected] / Land mail : department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 50 Memorial drive, Cambridge MA 02142, USA

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • J. Economic Theory

دوره 139  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2008