Identification in Symmetric English Auctions with Additively Separable Unobserved Heterogeneity
نویسنده
چکیده
I consider identification of a symmetric, independent private values model with additively separable unobserved heterogeneity from observation of winning bids in English auctions. If the number of bidders N is observable, the model is identified given exogenous variation in N , and N need only take two values. If N is not observable, the model is identified if observations are available from auctions under two different known probability distributions of N – for example, if N follows a Poisson distribution, with a mean that varies in a known way as a function of an observable “participation shifter” that is independent of valuations.
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