Why Managers Hold Shares of Their Firms: An Empirical Analysis
ثبت نشده
چکیده
We examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance. Firms in which the CEO voluntarily holds a considerable share of outstanding stocks outperform the market by more than 10 percent p.a. after controlling for traditional risk factors. The effect is most pronounced in firms that are characterized by large managerial discretion of the CEO. The abnormal returns we document are one potential explanation why so many CEOs hold a large fraction of their own company’s stocks. We also examine several potential explanations why the existence of an owner CEO is not fully reflected in prices but leads to abnormal returns. JEL-Classification Codes: G12, G30
منابع مشابه
Impact of Buyback of Shares on Firm Value: An Empirical Evidence from India
The present study examines the impact of capital employed in buyback of shares on firm value for 180 firms listed in the Bombay Stock Exchange of India. The issue of buyback of shares in the period from 2006 to 2016 was examined. The firm value is measured by a proxy, enterprise value, as a substitute of share price. The results suggest that the firm value differs from pre and post buyback of s...
متن کاملEmployee Stock Options and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings
The central question surrounding the IPO underpricing puzzle is why issuers are willing to sell their shares at a price that is less than what the market is willing to pay. This paper shows that a major reason why managers are willing to underprice shares at IPO is that they use options and stock grants to protect themselves from the dilution to their existing shares. Underpricing can have a la...
متن کاملEmployee Stock Options and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings
The central question surrounding the IPO underpricing puzzle is why issuers are willing to sell their shares at a price that is less than what the market is willing to pay. This paper shows that a major reason why managers are willing to underprice shares at IPO is that they use options and stock grants to protect themselves from the dilution to their existing shares. Underpricing can have a la...
متن کاملWhy Managers Are Willing To Accept IPO Underpricing
The central question surrounding the IPO underpricing puzzle is why issuers are willing to sell their shares at a price that is less than what the market is willing to pay. This paper shows that a major reason why managers are willing to underprice shares at IPO is that they use options and stock grants to protect themselves from the dilution to their existing shares. Underpricing can have a la...
متن کاملFirm Leadership and Innovative Performance: Evidence on Five Business Sectors from Seven EU Countries
This paper considers the effect of different firm leadership on the innovative performance of firms from seven EU countries. We investigate whether owner-led or manager-led firms achieve a larger share of their turnover with product innovations. Economic theory does not propose clear results on that question. In the empirical analysis it turns out that the manager-led firms are more active inno...
متن کامل