The Cost of Compliance

Recent studies have called into question the effectiveness of international human rights treaties. In this study I examine the variations in compliance that governments display concerning the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). I argue that states will only keep their promises if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs involved. In distinguishing between implementation, reputation and domestic audience costs, I contend that states parties are more likely to comply with women’s political rights than their social and economic rights, as respect for the latter categories yields fewer benefits to governments. This expectation is confirmed, measuring the effect for 152 countries across a period of 20 years with the help of ordered logistic regression. Also, I find that religious influences have a negative effect on respect for women’s rights, while democratic institutions improve women’s position in society. ∗I would like to thank Gerald Schneider, Isabelle Stadelmann-Steffen, Willi Nagl, Ersin Özşahin, Johannes Kleibl, Nina Schulzek and my parents for helpful comments. All errors are mine.